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INTRODUCTION
“‘I prefer not to say I’m Rohingya,’ he said, ‘because it is very
dangerous here.’” 1 These are the words of Kamal, a Rohingya Muslim
man, who had to smuggle himself while relocating within his own

1. Timothy McLaughlin, ‘I Had No Options’: The Rohingya Man Who
Smuggled Himself, ATLANTIC (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2019/02/rohingya-man-smuggled-himself-myanmar/581806/.
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country to escape the violence sweeping Rakhine State in Myanmar. 2
Kamal’s family once owned a successful business in Sittwe, the capital
of Rakhine State. 3 However, his family’s wealth could not deter the
ensuing violence. 4 The Rohingya were attacked indiscriminately,
regardless of whether rich or poor. 5 At the peak of their detestation for
the Rohingya minority, Buddhist mobs destroyed the homes in Kamal’s
village. 6 Although Kamal escaped from his village, he is far from safe.
To survive, Kamal must hide his Rohingya ethnicity and must “live[]
in a cramped apartment with his aunt, uncle, and cousins; [additionally,
Kamal] finds his day job at a company importing electronics
unmotivating.” 7 This may not seem like the most horrible life, but
Kamal’s escape and survival were only possible through bribes and
lies. 8 However, Kamal’s story differs from the reality for most
Rohingya who do not have the means to escape the violence.
The Rohingya reside in Rakhine State, one of the poorest states in
Myanmar. 9 Therefore, unlike Kamal, most Rohingya cannot escape
through bribes and lies. 10 Consequently, “slaughter, rape and village
burnings” forced many Rohingya to exercise their only option—fleeing
the country. 11 For example, in 2014, before many Rohingya left for the
bordering country of Bangladesh, the Myanmar government’s violence
and evictions drove many Rohingya to seek shelter in “a wasteland of
camps” on their country’s western border. 12 These camps have been
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Jason Motlagh, The Survivors of the Rohingya Genocide, ROLLING STONE
(Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/rohingyagenocide-myanmar-701354/.
10. See id.; McLaughlin, supra note 1.
11. See Hannah Beech, First Rohingya Are to Be Returned to Myanmar Killing
(Nov.
14,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/
Grounds, N.Y. TIMES
2018/11/14/world/asia/rohingya-myanmar-repatriation.html.
12. Jason Motlagh, Myanmar: Burma’s Rohingya Left to Die in Concentration
Camps, TIME (June 17, 2014), http://time.com/2888864/rohingya-myanmar-burmacamps-sittwe/.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol50/iss1/7

2

Gomez: The International Criminal Court’s Decision on the Rohingya Crisi
Gomez camera ready (Do Not Delete)

2019]

1/15/2020 12:57 PM

THE ICC’S DECISION ON THE ROHINGYA CRISIS

179

described as “concentration camps,” nothing like the refugee camps
they were meant to be. 13 Many fled the country because of the
conditions in these camps. As of early 2019, over 700,000 Rohingya
have fled Myanmar. 14 In early 2017, an estimated one million
Rohingya lived in Myanmar, 15 meaning nearly three-quarters of the
Rohingya have fled. Yet, the international community has failed to
respond to this humanitarian crisis. 16
The Rohingya prosecution in Myanmar demonstrates the flaws of
modern international efforts to thwart human rights violations and the
need for comprehensive solutions to overcome moral and political
ideological differences.
Accordingly, this Comment addresses the International Criminal
Court’s (ICC) recent decision acknowledging that the court may
exercise jurisdiction over the Rohingya crisis, allowing the Chief
Prosecutor to proceed with a preliminary investigation into the
Rohingya people’s deportation from Myanmar. Part I of this Comment
summarizes the Rohingya crisis and highlights the court’s reasoning in
deciding to assert jurisdiction over the crime. Part II applies the court’s
main reasoning regarding trans-border jurisdiction to our modern
understanding of state sovereignty and international law to showcase
their compatibility. Part III, however, considers how specific sections
of the court’s argument—the possibility of expanding a future
investigation’s scope—are incompatible with current international law.
To further illustrate the potential impact of the court’s new precedent,
Part IV applies the court’s reasoning to ongoing conflicts in Palestine
and Syria. Part V outlines the ICC’s alternatives to asserting
jurisdiction, which would not have required the ICC to interpret its own
13. See, e.g., id.
14. Rohingya Refugee Crisis, U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF
HUMANITARIAN AFF., https://www.unocha.org/rohingya-refugee-crisis (last visited
Nov. 20, 2019).
15. Eleanor Albert & Andrew Chatzky, What Forces Are Fueling Myanmar’s
Rohingya Crisis?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, https://www.cfr.org/
backgrounder/rohingya-crisis (last updated Dec. 5, 2018).
16. See Genocide Against the Burmese Rohingya: Hearing Before the Comm.
of Foreign Affairs, 115th Cong. 84 (2018) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Rep.
Gerald E. Connolly) (“[O]ur failure to hold accountable those responsible for these
heinous atrocities gives a green light to human rights abusers not just in Burma, but
around the world. As Elie Wiesel said[,] ‘[H]uman suffering anywhere concerns men
and women everywhere.’”).
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jurisdictional power. This Comment concludes that although the ICC’s
decision to allow a preliminary investigation into the Rohingya
people’s deportation is a groundbreaking assertion of authority from an
international body, it is necessary for redefining trans-border
jurisdiction to comprehensively address human rights violations.
I. THE ROHINGYA CRISIS AND THE ICC’S RESPONSE
A. Rohingya Crisis
One of the most recent human rights violations is the mass forced
deportation of the Rohingya people from Myanmar. 17 The Rohingya
people are a stateless Indo-Aryan ethnic group who primarily resided
in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, near the southern border of Bangladesh. 18
The group is comprised of a Muslim majority and a Hindu minority.19
The Rohingya are considered a stateless group and, thus, have been
“marooned on an international border, unwanted by either side
[Myanmar and Bangladesh], weary, traumatized, . . . their very origins
in dispute.” 20
However, the minority Rohingya population’s clash with the
Buddhist majority, which is supported by the historically pro-Buddhistgovernment in Myanmar, is not a new occurrence. 21 The two groups’
confrontation began during World War II; the Rohingya Muslims
17. Eli Meixler, ICC to Examine Myanmar’s Deportation of Rohingya Muslims,
TIME (Sept. 19, 2018), http://time.com/5400224/myanmar-rohingya-deportations-iccpreliminary-examination/.
18. Albert & Chatzky, supra note 15; Shakeeb Asrar, Rohingya Crisis
JAZEERA
(Oct.
28,
2017),
Explained
in
Maps,
AL
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/09/rohingya-crisis-explainedmaps-170910140906580.html.
19. Susan Glazebrook, Special Issue Editor: Professor Campbell Mclachlan
QC: The Refugee Convention in the 21st Century, 49 Victoria U. of Wellington L.
Rev. [VUWLR] 479 n.13 (2018) (N.Z.).
20. Jeffrey Gettleman, Fate of Stateless Rohingya Muslims Is in Antagonistic
Hands, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/03/
world/asia/rohingya-myanmar-bangladesh-stateless.html.
21. Krishnadev Calamur, The Misunderstood Roots of Burma’s Rohingya
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
25,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/
Crisis,
international/archive/2017/09/rohingyas-burma/540513/; INT’L CRISIS GRP.,
BUDDHISM AND STATE POWER IN MYANMAR (2017), https://www.crisisgroup.org/
asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/290-buddhism-and-state-power-myanmar.
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supported the British forces, while the Buddhist majority allied itself
with the Japanese, which caused constant conflict between the two
groups. 22 Since then, the Rohingya have been under systematic attacks
involving “oppression, periodic mass expulsions[,] and denials of their
identity.” 23 These attacks also arise from a predominant view that
Myanmar government officials share: the Rohingya people are illegal
immigrants who arrived from the bordering state of Bangladesh. 24 This
is a prevalent view despite evidence that Rohingya have been present
in Myanmar since 1799. 25
This view of the Rohingya has led to recent brutal attacks on the
group, which have prompted some international condemnation. In
August 2017, the military cracked down on the Rohingya population,
leading many of them to flee their homes. 26 During this particular
crackdown, the militants burned Rohingya villages, one after the other,
intending to remove the Rohingya from the land. 27 As of early 2019,
such unprecedented attacks have led over 700,000 Rohingya to flee
Myanmar into the neighboring country of Bangladesh. 28 The United
Nations (U.N.) classified these ongoing attacks on the Rohingya as
“hallmarks of genocide.” 29
The Myanmar government’s general response has been to deny any
wrongful intent and the occurrence of any alleged events. 30 For
22. Jaayita Sarkar, How WWII Shaped the Crisis in Myanmar, WASH. POST
(Mar.
10,
2019,
3:00
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/
2019/03/10/how-wwii-shaped-crisis-myanmar/.
23. Nicholas Kristof, Myanmar’s Appalling Apartheid, N.Y. TIMES (May 28,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/opinion/kristof-myanmars-appallingapartheid.html.
24. See id.
25. Id.
26. Reuters, ‘Hallmarks of Genocide’: ICC Prosecutor Seeks Justice for
Rohingya, GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2018, 6:14 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2018/apr/10/rohingya-crisis-icc-prosecutor-seeks-power-to-investigatecrimes-against-humanity.
27. Gettleman, supra note 20.
28. John Quinley III, The Rohingya Diaspora Is Crucial to Achieving Justice,
TIME (Feb. 14, 2019), http://time.com/5529321/rohingya-myanmar-genocide-fortifyrights-diaspora/.
29. Reuters, supra note 26.
30. See, e.g., Hannah Beech & Saw Nang, Myanmar Rejects U.N. Findings: ‘No
Ethnic Cleansing or Genocide in Our Country’, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2018),
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example, the Myanmar government’s response to the claim that its
military burned down Rohingya villages was that “the Rohingya burned
down their own villages.” 31 Additionally, the government downplayed
the bulldozing of villages, stating that it was trying to facilitate the
Rohingya’s return to Myanmar by making the land suitable for
rebuilding. 32 However, the government has acknowledged and excused
the occurrence of some crackdowns, claiming they were a response to
“threats from . . . Rohingya insurgents who carried out fatal raids on
Myanmar security posts on Aug[ust] 25[, 2017].” 33
International efforts to stop these human rights violations have
mainly been limited to world leaders’ talks and speeches, without any
formal initiatives to hold the perpetrators accountable. Thus, there is
merit to the U.N.’s belief that the international community has “buried
its head in the sand” 34 by failing to address Myanmar’s crimes.
B. ICC’s Response
The International Criminal Court’s decision to open an
investigation into Myanmar’s crimes is potentially the most effective
effort taken to secure justice and accountability for the Rohingya
people.
On July 1, 2002, the Rome Statute entered into force, establishing
the ICC. 35 The ICC aims to “participat[e] in a global fight to end
impunity, . . . to hold those responsible accountable for their crimes
[through international criminal justice,] and to help prevent these
crimes from happening again.” 36 Although other international justice
systems exist, such as the International Court of Justice (the judicial
branch of the United Nations), their interdependence with the United
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/14/world/asia/un-myanmar-rohingyagenocide.html.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id. (Adama Dieng, the United Nations special advisor on the prevention
of genocide, asserted this claim).
35. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
36. About, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/about (last visited Nov. 21,
2019).
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Nations predisposes them to bureaucratic gridlock. Accordingly, the
ICC was created to be the first truly permanent, impartial, and
independent international criminal court. 37 The United Nations created
the court to address the shortcomings of modern international efforts,
such as the “selective justice” of ad hoc tribunals and prevalence of
uncooperative national authorities. 38
As of 2019, 122 countries are State Parties to the Rome Statute,
having both ratified and signed the original law. 39 By signing and
ratifying the Rome Statute, these State Parties agreed to support the
ICC’s efforts and goals. However, the ICC members failed to refer
Myanmar’s crimes to the court, which illustrated their apathy regarding
the Rohingya crisis. Through their inaction, the members forced the
court to interpret and expand its jurisdictional authority.
1. Chief Prosecutor’s Request
The ICC is not the only international body that has failed to take
effective formal action to resolve the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar.
For example, the International Court of Justice has repeatedly failed to
get referrals from members to litigate pressing disputes; however, even

37. See The ICC Will Continue Its Independent and Impartial Work,
Undeterred, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1406; see also Simone Halink, All Things
Considered: How the International Court of Justice Delegated Its Fact-Assessment to
the United Nations in the Armed Activities Case, 40 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol.14, 37
(2008) (“An additional complication is that the parties to the Court are sovereign states
that, when presenting evidence, focus on the political impact of their case just as much
as on its judicial impact.”).
38. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court - Overview, UNITED
NATIONS, http://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2019).
Selective justice refers to the idea that although there may be many wrongdoers, the
court only seeks prosecution for a select few, which some parties have used to argue
the court is discriminating against them. Peter Tatchell, Selective Justice, GUARDIAN
(Jan.
5,
2007,
6:10
AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2007/jan/05/selectivejustice.
39. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/states parties/pages/thestatespartiestotheromestatute.aspx (last
visited Nov. 21, 2019).
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in those few cases that are litigated and binding, member states simply
veto the decision, hindering any potential resolution. 40
The ICC’s Chief Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, sought to redeem
previous unsuccessful efforts and further the ICC’s goal to end
impunity. Thus, Bensouda began a new process to hold the Myanmar
government responsible for its crimes against the Rohingya people.
Specifically, on April 9, 2018, the Chief Prosecutor asked the ICC’s
Pre-Trial Chamber I to assess whether the ICC had jurisdiction to
investigate the crimes against humanity—particularly deportation—
occurring in Myanmar against the Rohingya minority. 41
2. Pre-Trial Chamber I Decision
The Prosecutor’s request posed a difficult question for the court
because the ICC, like many other international courts, has limited
jurisdiction. 42 The ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to addressing genocide,

40. SEC. COUNCIL REPORT, MONTHLY FORECAST: OVERVIEW 1-2 (2017),
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/2017_01_forecast.pdf (discussing the United Nations Security
Council’s historical deficiency in utilizing the International Court of Justice and the
notable historical example where “[t]he US vetoed a draft resolution calling for full
compliance with the ICJ judgment” regarding the Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua Case). But see Gambia Brings Genocide Case Against
Myanmar: International Court of Justice to Address Atrocities Against Rohingya,
RTS.
WATCH
(Nov.
11,
2019,
5:21
AM),
HUM.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/11/gambia-brings-genocide-case-againstmyanmar# (on November 11, 2019, after the writing of this article, Gambia filed a
case against Myanmar regarding the Rohingya crisis with the International Court of
Justice).
41. Application Under Regulation 46(3), Case No. ICC-RoC46(3)-01-18,
Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction Under Article 19(3) of the Statute,
¶ 1 (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4af756/pdf/ [hereinafter
Prosecutor’s Request]. The Pre-Trial Chamber consists of a panel of judges who make
pre-trial determinations, such as whether an arrest warrant should be issued or whether
there is sufficient evidence to proceed with a trial. Pre-Trial, INT’L CRIM. CT.,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/Pre-Trial.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2019).
42. Terrence Chapman & Stephen Chaudoin, People Like the International
Criminal Court – As Long As It Targets Other Problems in Other Countries, WASH.
POST
(Jan.
20,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2017/01/20/people-like-the-international-criminal-court-as-long-as-ittargets-other-problems-in-other-countries/.
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aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 43 In the
Rohingya case, the Chief Prosecutor alleged the Myanmar government
was responsible for forcible deportation, which is specifically identified
as a crime against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute. 44
However, the court faced several challenges in determining
whether it could assert jurisdiction over the Rohingya conflict. The
court’s greatest challenge lay in satisfying one of the preconditions
necessary to assert jurisdiction. Specifically, to conclude that it has
jurisdiction over a crime, the court must demonstrate any of the
following: (1) the crime occurred inside a State Party’s territory, (2) a
State Party national committed the crime, 45 or (3) the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) referred the crime to the Chief Prosecutor. 46
Here, the court encountered a problem because the UNSC had not
referred the deportation to the ICC. 47 Moreover, a State Party national
had not committed the crime 48 because Myanmar is not a State Party to
the Rome Statute. 49 Additionally, Myanmar’s non-Party status
prevented the court from justifying its jurisdiction based on a strict
territoriality basis. 50 As a result, the court’s only option to justify its
43. Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 5.
44. Id. art. 7(1)(d).
45. Id. art. 12(2). A State Party is a country that has both signed and ratified the
Rome Statute, meaning it has accepted the jurisdiction and legal obligations of the
ICC. See State Parties to the ICC, ABA-ICC PROJECT, https://www.abaicc.org/about-the-icc/states-parties-to-the-icc/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2019).
46. Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 13(b). See Geoff Curfman, ICC
Jurisdiction and the Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 9, 2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/50793/icc-jurisdiction-rohingya-crisis-myanmar/
(discussing the possible bases for the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction over the Rohingya
crisis).
47. Curfman, supra note 46.
48. Id.
49. Antoni Slodkowski, Myanmar to ICC: Rohingya Jurisdiction Request
(Aug.
9,
2018,
6:14
AM),
‘Should
Be
Dismissed’,
REUTERS
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya/myanmar-to-icc-rohingyajurisdiction-request-should-be-dismissed-idUSKBN1KU1NG (The office of
government leader Aung San Suu Kyi pointed to Myanmar’s lack of state party status
as a key reason Myanmar was not responding to the ICC Prosecutor’s request for
jurisdiction.).
50. Curfman, supra note 46. Territoriality simply refers to one of the
preconditions to assert jurisdiction, which is that the court has jurisdiction over the
crime because the crime occurred inside the territory/borders of a State Party. Am.
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jurisdiction was to find that the crime of deportation somehow occurred
inside a State Party’s territory.
Once the court establishes jurisdiction, it must still meet separate
conditions to exercise that authority to investigate the crime. The court
may only exercise jurisdiction under the following limited
circumstances: (1) a State Party refers the crime to the court, (2) the
UNSC refers the crime to the court, or (3) the Pre-Trial Chamber
approves the Prosecutor’s request for an investigation. 51 In this case,
the Chief Prosecutor requested that the Pre-Trial Chamber I decide
whether the court has jurisdiction to investigate the crime of deportation
against the Rohingya—the first step in proceeding with a request to
open a formal investigation.
After nearly five months of consideration, the Pre-Trial Chamber
reached a decision on September 6, 2018. 52 The Pre-Trial Chamber
concluded the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over the Rohingya crisis
in Myanmar and authorized the Chief Prosecutor to consider examining
the alleged crimes, mainly deportation. 53
In its decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber articulated “that the
requirement of displacement across a border constitutes a specific
element of the crime of deportation under article 7(1)(d) of the
Statute.” 54 Furthermore, the court noted that decisions regarding
territoriality have been uncontroversial thus far because all elements of

Soc’y Int’l L., Jurisdictional, Preliminary, and Procedural Concerns, in BENCHBOOK
INTERNATIONAL LAW§ II.A (Diane Marie Amann ed., 2014),
ON
https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/benchbook/jurisdiction.pdf (discussing the
different bases for asserting jurisdiction). In this Comment, strict territoriality means
the conduct of the alleged crime occurred completely inside the territory.
51. Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 13, 14, 15(3)-(5).
52. Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I Rules That the
Court May Exercise Jurisdiction over the Alleged Deportation of the Rohingya People
from Myanmar to Bangladesh (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1403.
53. See Request Under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, Case
No. ICC-RoC46(3)-01-18, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on
Jurisdiction Under Article 19(3) of the Statute,” ¶¶ 72-73, 78-88 (Sept. 6, 2018),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2018_04203.PDF
[hereinafter
The
Decision]. It is important to note that the Pre-Trial Chamber I conditioned the exercise
of jurisdiction on “the allegations [being] established to the required threshold.” Id. ¶
78.
54. Id. ¶ 60.
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the crime are usually committed inside a State Party’s territory. 55
However, the court clarified that under Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome
Statute, only one element of the crime needs to occur inside a State
Party’s territory, although the Statute does not expressly state that
proposition. 56 Thus, this modified territoriality argument under Article
12(2)(a) generated controversy regarding the ICC’s decision to exercise
jurisdiction over the Rohingya crisis.
Considering this modification, the court noted that the crime of
deportation against the Rohingya was not complete until the group was
displaced across the border into Bangladesh. 57 This meant that part of
the crime, the crossing of a border, occurred inside Bangladesh—a
country that had signed and ratified the Rome Statute. 58 Therefore, part
of the crime of deportation could qualify as having occurred within a
State Party’s territory. Consequently, the court determined it could
meet one of the preconditions for asserting jurisdiction under Article 12
of the Rome Statute, and all that remained was for the Pre-Trial
Chamber to authorize the court’s exercise of jurisdiction by approving
the Chief Prosecutor’s investigation. 59 Based on the Chief Prosecutor’s
arguments and its own findings, the Pre-Trial Chamber approved a
preliminary investigation into the crime of deportation committed
against the Rohingya people of Myanmar in accordance with the proper
procedures and international principles. 60
In addition to extending its territorial jurisdiction, the court noted it
might potentially expand the investigation’s scope depending on the
Chief Prosecutor’s findings from the preliminary investigation. 61 The

55. Id. ¶ 63.
56. Id. ¶¶ 64-65. See Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 12(2)(a). The Court came
to this determination based on a “contextual interpretation” of the article. The
Decision, supra note 53, ¶ 65.
57. The Decision, supra note 53, ¶ 73.
58. Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on Opening a Preliminary
Examination Concerning the Alleged Deportation of the Rohingya People from
Myanmar to Bangladesh, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180918-otp-stat-Rohingya [hereinafter Statement of
the Prosecutor].
59. The Decision, supra note 53, ¶¶ 73, 79.
60. Id. ¶¶ 80-88.
61. Id. ¶¶ 74-79. See Statement of the Prosecutor, supra note 58 (“My Office
will further consider whether other crimes under article 7 of the Rome Statute may be
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main rationale for allowing potential expansion was that “coercive acts”
might have resulted in the Rohingya’s deportation from Myanmar. 62
The court, anticipating that its decision would spark controversy,
noted that a similar expansive territorial jurisdiction approach has been
widely accepted by many international and national systems. 63
Importantly, the court identified other treaties Myanmar is a party to
that follow a jurisdictional approach similar to the one the ICC accepted
in this case. 64 Therefore, the court concluded its decision conformed to
international legal norms. Although the court’s arguments and
conclusion are not baseless or false, they merit further discussion.
II. THE DECISION’S COMPATIBILITY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
The ICC’s decision on the Rohingya crisis represented the court’s
liberal construction of its jurisdictional power because no part of Article
12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute specifies that only one element of the
crime(s) needs to occur inside a State Party’s territory. 65 However, the
court reached this interpretation due to the “context of the relevant rules
of international law and in the light of the object and purpose of the
[Rome] Statute.” 66 The court cited various sources to reconcile its
decision with international law, 67 including national sources that
demonstrate how numerous countries exercise a similar trans-border
jurisdiction. 68 The court also cited international sources, like the
Permanent Court of International Justice. 69

applicable to the situation at hand, such as the crimes of persecution and other
inhumane acts.”).
62. The Decision, supra note 53, ¶¶ 61, 74-79. See Statement of the Prosecutor,
supra note 58 (“[T]he preliminary examination may take into account a number of
alleged coercive acts having resulted in the forced displacement of the Rohingya
people, including deprivation of fundamental rights, killing, sexual violence, enforced
disappearance, destruction, and looting.”).
63. The Decision, supra note 53, ¶¶ 63, 66-68.
64. Id. ¶ 67, 67 n.111.
65. See Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 12(2)(a).
66. The Decision, supra note 53, ¶ 72.
67. See id. ¶¶ 65-71 nn.106-118.
68. Id. ¶¶ 67-68 nn.112-115.
69. Id. ¶ 66 n.107.
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A. Compatibility with National Law and State Sovereignty
In reaching a decision, the court confronted the principle that “any
tangible human rights enforcement mechanism must come from states’
own domestic legal system.” 70 Although the court generally shows
respect for state sovereignty by acting only when national authorities
fail to address a situation, 71 when “a state ignores — or itself carries
out — human rights abuses, the principle of state sovereignty comes into
conflict with any possibility for resolution.” 72 Such conflict was
manifest in the Rohingya crisis because Myanmar’s legal system failed
to address the Rohingya’s plea for peace. 73 To overcome this conflict
and justify its assertion of jurisdiction, the court cited several national
sources. 74 In its decision, the court respected this principle of deference
to national authorities by citing specific countries’ laws that resemble
the court’s jurisdictional argument.
For example, the court’s decision is compatible with Australia’s
Criminal Code Act because the code states that “‘a person does not
commit the offence unless: (a) the conduct constituting the alleged
offence occurs: (i) wholly or partly in Australia.’” 75 Additionally, the
Czech Republic’s Criminal Code uses similar language, stating that it
is irrelevant whether the act was intended to occur wholly or partly

70. Holly Brooke, State Sovereignty and Human Rights – Irreconcilable
Tensions, MEDIUM (June 7, 2017), https://medium.com/@hollybrooke/statesovereignty-and-human-rights-irreconcilable-tensions-462d356ae063
(explaining
what it means to respect state sovereignty). See The Decision, supra note 53, ¶¶ 6372.
71. How the Court Works, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/howthe-court-works (last visited Nov. 22, 2019) (“[The ICC] prosecutes cases only when
States do not [because they] are unwilling or unable to do so genuinely.”).
72. Brooke, supra note 70.
73. See generally Maung Zarni & Alice Cowley, The Slow-Burning Genocide
of Myanmar’s Rohingya, 23 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 683 (2014). “The lack of legal
protection for non-citizens, together with the implementation of local policies and a
dysfunctional judicial system, deemed to have failed even minimalist models of the
rule of law, govern the lives of the Rohingya in North Rakhine State, rendering
everyday activities illegal and thus allowing free-reign for extortion, abuse, impunity,
and wide-spread human rights abuses.” Id. at 709.
74. The Decision, supra note 53, ¶¶ 67-68 nn.112-115.
75. Id. ¶ 66 n.109 (emphasis added) (quoting Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s
14.1, para. 2(a) (Austl.)).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2020

13

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 50, No. 1 [2020], Art. 7
Gomez camera ready (Do Not Delete)

1/15/2020 12:57 PM

190 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50
abroad. 76 Furthermore, Georgia’s Criminal Code expresses that “‘[a]
crime shall be considered to have been committed in the territory of
Georgia if it began, continued and terminated or ended in the territory
of Georgia.’” 77 The court cited such sources to show that its decision
would not violate the principle of state sovereignty because nations, like
those noted above, have criminal systems that follow a similar
jurisdictional approach. Citing these sources also showed that the
single element argument was not a new approach, as many criminal
systems only require that part of a crime be committed inside their
territory. This indicates the court’s arguments had some basis rooted in
the laws of various nations.
Although the court’s citation to nations’ laws was persuasive at
best, the court also directly cited Myanmar’s laws to strengthen its
justification. The court noted Myanmar’s Penal Code, which articulates
the following:
[a]ny person liable, by any law in force in the Union of Burma [now
known as Myanmar], to be tried for an offence committed beyond
the limits of the Union of Burma, shall be [dealt] with according to
the provisions of this Code for any act committed beyond the Union
of Burma in the same manner as if such act had been committed
within the Union of Burma. 78

Essentially, Myanmar’s laws allow it to exercise jurisdiction over
crimes that only partially occurred within its territory and sometimes
over crimes committed completely outside of its borders. But, the court
went further and cited Bangladesh’s law, the State Party involved in
this action, and demonstrated that Bangladesh’s Penal Code contains
similar language. 79 Therefore, the court believed its underlying
rationale was justified because both countries involved in the dispute

76. Id. (quoting Trestní zákon, Zákon č. [Criminal Code], 40/2009 Sb. (Czech)).
77. Id. ¶ 66 n.108 (quoting article (4)(2) of the Georgia Criminal Code).
78. Id. ¶ 67. Myanmar was formerly known as Burma. Who, What, Why: Should
It Be Burma or Myanmar?, BBC NEWS MAG. (Dec. 2, 2011),
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-16000467.
79. The Decision, supra note 53, ¶ 68 (“Every person shall be liable to
punishment under this Code and not otherwise for every act or omission contrary to
the provisions thereof, of which he shall be guilty within Bangladesh.”). See id. ¶ 68
nn.113-15.
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have codified laws that allow them to encroach upon another nation’s
sovereignty to investigate extra-territorial crimes.
B. Compatibility with International Law
Although some of the court’s cited international treaties do not
expressly support its proposition, 80 there are existing laws and
principles that support its position. For example, the Case of the S.S.
“Lotus” (Lotus), decided by the Permanent Court of International
Justice in 1927, includes a supporting principle. 81 In Lotus, a French
ship collided with a Turkish ship on the high seas; Turkish forces then
arrested the captain of the Turkish ship and a Lieutenant (Demons) from
the French ship. 82 Protesting the arrest, the Lieutenant argued Turkey
lacked jurisdiction to initiate criminal proceedings against him.83
Consequently, the French and Turkish authorities agreed to ask the
Permanent Court of International Justice to resolve the dispute. 84 In
Lotus, the court concluded Turkey had jurisdiction because in
international criminal law the concept of territoriality is “not an
absolute principle.” 85 Lotus’s “impact as a source of foundational
principles in various areas of international law has been lasting.” 86 By
citing to Lotus, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber suggests it is adopting this
established principle. Although Lotus’s status in international law is

80. Unlike the cited national sources, the international sources cited by the Court
are ambiguous at best as to the partial territoriality reasoning that the Court concluded
was valid. For example, most of its citations to treaties that Myanmar is a party to
only deal with extradition of a party national and not the occurrence of the crime inside
a territory. See id. ¶ 67 n.111.
81. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 20 (Sept. 7)
(holding that territoriality in criminal law “is not an absolute principle of international
law”); The Decision, supra note 53, ¶ 66 n.107.
82. Hugh Handeyside, Note, The Lotus Principle in ICJ Jurisprudence: Was the
Ship Ever Afloat?, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 71, 73 (2007).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 73-74 (“‘(1) Has Turkey . . . acted in conflict with the principles of
international law - and if so, what principles - by instituting . . . criminal proceedings
in pursuance of Turkish law against M. Demons . . .?’”) (quoting Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 10, at 5).
85. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 20.
86. Handeyside, supra note 82, at 71.
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notable, it is unclear whether citing to only one case is sufficiently
persuasive.
Moreover, the ICC also referred to international treaties that
Myanmar is a party to that adopt a similar trans-border jurisdiction
argument. These cited treaties include the following: the International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. 87 These treaties require
Myanmar “to take measures to establish its jurisdiction . . . in cases
where the alleged offender is present in its territory, irrespective of the
location of the commission of the alleged offence or the nationality of
the alleged offender.” 88 Thus, the court highlights that Myanmar denies
the court’s jurisdiction, yet allows a similar jurisdictional enforcement
under the noted treaties.
III. THE SCOPE OF THE COURT’S DECISION
Although the court’s reasoning regarding trans-border jurisdiction
is compatible with international law and principles of state sovereignty,
the second part of the court’s decision regarding the possible expansion
of the investigative scope is questionable. The court tried to broaden
its decision’s scope by stating it could also exercise jurisdiction over
crimes that might have led to the crime of deportation. 89 These crimes
involve both “coercive acts” and other crimes under Article 7 of the
Rome Statute, 90 which are crimes that may not possess the same transborder element as the crime of forcible deportation. However, this is

87. The Decision, supra note 53, ¶ 67 n.111.
88. Id. ¶ 67.
89. Id. ¶¶ 60-61, 74-78.
90. Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 7(2)(d); The Decision, supra note 53, ¶ 61
(explaining other coercive acts may include “deprivation of fundamental rights,
killing, sexual violence, torture, enforced disappearance, destruction and looting”); id.
¶¶ 74-78 (referring to the crime of persecution and other inhumane acts as the other
crimes under Article 7 of the Rome Statute). See Statement of the Prosecutor, supra
note 58 (stating the possibility of examining several alleged coercive acts and other
crimes under Article 7 of the Rome Statute).
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controversial because the underlying rationale of the ICC’s decision
only justifies jurisdiction over trans-border crimes. 91
Essentially, trans-border crimes, such as deportation, could serve
as a Trojan Horse, 92 allowing the court to investigate a non-State Party
for crimes beyond those that international law expressly allows it to
exercise jurisdiction over. Unlike in its deportation analysis, the court
does not cite any international law sources to justify its Trojan Horse
argument. 93 Unlike how the court cited national codes to justify its
expansive territorial jurisdiction approach, here, the court did not defer
to the principle of state sovereignty, failing to cite any national sources
that supported its argument. 94
In its conclusion, the court attempted to limit the application of its
decision and reasoning by stating that at least one element of the crime
must occur within a State Party’s territory to justify an investigation.
The court noted that it may also have jurisdiction over the crime of
persecution, which is a crime against humanity, because “an element or
part of this crime (i.e. the cross-border transfer) takes place on the
territory of a State Party.” 95 Additionally, the court addressed another
potential crime—”‘other inhumane acts’”—that it could have
investigated under Article 7 of the Rome Statute. 96 However, the court
did not explain why it discussed potential jurisdiction for these crimes

91. See The Decision, supra note 53, ¶¶ 57-72. In this comment, trans-border
crimes refers to crimes where at least one element of the crime involves the crossing
of a border, as in the case of deportation. The Decision, supra note 53, ¶ 60.
92. In this comment, the Trojan Horse analogy is meant to illustrate how the
court, through its groundbreaking decision, may have an unintended and
consequential impact beyond investigating the crime of deportation. Though not
deceptive as the classic Trojan Horse of Greek canon, the ICC’s interpretation of its
jurisdictional power goes far beyond what meets the eye. Editors of Encyclopaedia
BRITANNICA,
Britannica,
Trojan
Horse,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Trojan-horse (last visited Nov. 30, 2019)
(explaining the Trojan Horse mythology).
93. See The Decision, supra note 53, ¶¶ 65-77 nn.106-23. The court does not
explain why it has the legal authority to investigate other crimes if its jurisdictional
grounds are solely based on the trans-border nature of the alleged crime: deportation.
See also id. ¶¶ 65-77.
94. See id. ¶ 66 nn.108-09.
95. Id. ¶ 76.
96. Id. ¶ 77 (quoting Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 7(1)(k)).
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when the Chief Prosecutor did not allege them. 97 The absence of an
explanation is significant because the court believed the crimes share a
similar element: the crossing of a border. 98 It is possible that the Chief
Prosecutor and the court decided to sideline these crimes because they
do not provoke the same impactful image as deportation—the image of
over 700,000 Rohingya crossing the border into another country.
Ultimately, it was this mass deportation and not the other crimes that
provoked the need for a humanitarian response, which likely influenced
the court’s focus.
IV. APPLYING THE ICC’S REASONING TO OTHER SCENARIOS
Although the ICC’s decision may not seem groundbreaking in light
of precedent like Lotus, the decision’s effects are far-reaching. For
example, two current situations, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the
Syrian conflict, demonstrate the extensive potential reach of the ICC’s
decision. Both situations are similar because other international
community efforts have failed to effectively address them. Moreover,
both conflicts share four key characteristics that are central to the ICC’s
reasoning in its decision regarding the Rohingya crisis. These shared
characteristics include the following: (1) the affected party is a State
Party to the Rome Statute or has accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction, (2) the
crime(s) committed are crime(s) that the ICC has jurisdiction over, (3)
at least one element of the crime(s) being committed within a State
Party’s territory is being committed by a non-State Party, and (4) the
crime contains a trans-border element or has a trans-border effect.
A. Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
The ICC’s decision regarding the Rohingya crisis may impact the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The ICC has attempted to address the
conflict before, but it was unsuccessful. In April 2015, Palestine
became a State Party to the Rome Statute, giving the ICC jurisdiction

97. See id. ¶¶ 74-79; Prosecutor’s Request, supra note 41.
98. The Decision, supra note 53, ¶ 78.
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to investigate “crimes committed in the territory since June 13, 2014.” 99
On the other hand, Israel has not ratified the Rome Statute. 100
In 2015, the ICC began a preliminary investigation into the
“situation in Palestine.” 101 However, preliminary investigations
typically take years unless a State Party requests a formal investigation
through referral. 102 In 2015, Palestine did not request such an
investigation, and thus no real progress was made. 103 There was no
referral, in part, because international donors pressured the Palestinian
National Authority (PA), the interim self-government of the Gaza strip,
to refrain from pursuing an investigation. 104 In 2015, Israel withheld
tax revenues that it typically collects for PA to pressure Palestine to not
open an investigation and in retaliation for Palestine becoming a State
Party to the Rome Statute. 105 Additionally, since joining the ICC, both
Israel and the United States have consistently threatened and pressured
Palestine not to make any formal requests to the ICC 106; thus, at the
time, it was highly improbable that Palestine would refer the situation
to the ICC. 107
However, in 2018, Palestine resisted these pressures and referred
Israel’s crimes to the ICC. 108 Among the issues Palestine wanted the
court to investigate were land disputes and attacks on unarmed
protestors. 109 Israel responded to Palestine’s request by arguing the
ICC lacked jurisdiction over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for two
99. Zena Tahhan, Palestine Submits ICC Referral to Open Probe into ‘Israel
crimes’, AL JAZEERA (May 22, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/
palestine-submits-icc-referral-open-probe-israel-crimes-180522101121093.html.
100. Id.
101. Preliminary Examination: Palestine, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icccpi.int/palestine (last visited Nov. 30, 2019).
102. Tahhan, supra note 99.
103. Id.
104. Id.; Jennifer Williams, Israeli Officials Fear a Looming Disaster: The
Collapse of the Palestinian Authority, VOX (Jan. 4, 2016, 8:00 AM),
https://www.vox.com/2016/1/4/10690270/collapse-palestinian-authority (defining
what the Palestinian National Authority is).
105. Tahhan, supra note 99.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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reasons: (1) Palestine is not a recognized state, and (2) Israel has never
accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction because it has never signed and ratified
the Rome Statute. 110 In response, the ICC issued a warning to Israel
stating “that extensive destruction of property without military
necessity and population transfers in an occupied territory constitute
war crimes under the Rome Statute.” 111 Again, Israel argued the ICC
lacked jurisdiction to investigate the situation and further noted that
Israel’s legal system conducts its own war crime investigations. 112
Thus, Israel contended that its own legal system makes it sovereign and
shields it from ICC criminal investigations.
On the other hand, the ICC’s position is that the court will not
investigate or prosecute individuals unless national authorities cannot
or will not take action to address the alleged crimes. 113 Here, the court’s
willingness to investigate Israel’s crimes indicates that Israel’s legal
system is not properly addressing the issues Palestine is raising.
However, as of 2019, despite Palestine’s referral and the Chief
Prosecutor’s warning, the ICC has not opened any formal investigations
against Israel. 114
However, with the court’s recent decision regarding the Rohingya
crisis, the ICC may have new precedent to open a formal investigation
into Israel’s war crimes in the disputed area of Gaza. A formal
investigation is possible because the Israeli-Palestinian conflict shares
similar conditions with the Rohingya crisis that were key in justifying
the decision.
First, Palestine, the affected party, is a State Party to the Rome
Statute, which means the ICC would have jurisdiction to investigate

110. Id.
111. Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou
Bensouda, Regarding the Situation in Palestine, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Oct. 17, 2018),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=181017-otp-stat-palestine.
112. Id.
113. How the Court Works, supra note 71.
114. See Oliver Holmes, Palestinian Minister Delivers Israel ‘War Crimes’
(May
22,
2018,
10:37
AM),
Referral
to
ICC,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/22/palestinian-minister-israel-warcrimes-icc-referral; see also Situations Under Investigation, INT’L CRIM. CT.,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx (last visited Dec. 1, 2019) (the IsraeliPalestinian conflict is not currently listed among the twelve situations under
investigation).
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crimes under any of the following conditions: (1) the crimes occurred
inside Palestine’s territory, (2) the crimes are committed by Palestinian
nationals, or (3) the crimes are referred to the court by the UNSC.
However, like Myanmar, Israel, the accused party, is also a non-State
Party because it has neither signed or ratified the Rome Statute nor
accepted the ICC’s limited jurisdiction.
Second, the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor classified Israel’s actions as
war crimes. Palestine also classified Israel’s actions as war crimes
when it requested that the ICC open an investigation. 115 Therefore,
Israel’s alleged crimes fall under the court’s jurisdiction because Article
5 of the Rome Statute identifies war crimes as one of the categories of
crimes under the ICC’s investigative prerogative. 116
Third, the specific war crime that either Palestine or the Chief
Prosecutor may allege is the willful killing of Palestinians. Under
Article 8(2)(a)(i) of the Rome Statute, willful killing constitutes a war
crime and may fall under the ICC’s jurisdiction. 117 This crime occurs
inside the Gaza territory, which is recognized as part of the Palestinian
National Authority. 118 One specific instance of Israel’s alleged willful
killing occurred on March 30, 2018, when Israel killed over 100
Palestinian protestors in the Gaza Strip. 119
A critical question in determining if this new court precedent
applies to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is whether this crime has some
trans-border element or effect. In the March 30th incident, the Israeli
soldiers who shot the protestors were on the Israeli side of the GazaIsrael border and did not cross the border into the Gaza territory.120
However, the deaths occurred inside the Gaza Strip, Palestine, a State
Party’s territory. 121 Therefore, the crime of willful killing committed
by Israeli soldiers had an effect across the border, in Palestine.
115. Holmes, supra note 114.
116. Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 5(c).
117. Id. art. 8(2)(a)(i).
118. Palestinian Territories Profile, BBC NEWS (Apr. 8, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14630174.
119. Tahhan, supra note 99.
120. See David M. Halbfinger, Isabel Kershner & Declan Walsh, Israel Kills
Dozens at Gaza Border as U.S. Embassy Opens in Jerusalem, N.Y. TIMES (May 14,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/14/world/middleeast/gaza-protestspalestinians-us-embassy.html.
121. See id.
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Palestine may not be able to convince the court to open an investigation
based on this incident alone; however, the Chief Prosecutor may be
driven to request the Pre-Trial Chamber to authorize an investigation
based on the escalating number of serious crimes Israel is committing
in Palestine. 122
Another potential crime Israel is committing against Palestinians is
deportation, which has a trans-border element. Since the court has
established precedent granting it jurisdiction over crimes with a transborder element, Israel’s crime of deportation could bolster the court’s
argument for exercising jurisdiction. The allegation is that “[s]ince the
establishment of Israel in 1948, deportation has been used to expel
Palestinians from their land, both individually and en masse”; 123 this
would form the core of the case against Israel.
Israel is likely to reject this broader jurisdictional argument.
However, the court’s new precedent would likely support exercising
broader jurisdiction to investigate Israel’s crimes, including war crimes
such as willful killing and deportation. Nonetheless, the ICC may
choose not to initiate an investigation because the magnitude of the
people affected is low compared to the Rohingya crisis. 124
B. Syrian Conflict
The Syrian conflict more closely resembles the Rohingya crisis.
Due to the similarities, the Syrian conflict may fall under the ICC’s
jurisdiction. The Syrian conflict has been shaped by “poor governance,
violence, and resulting waves of displacement [in the Middle East].”125
The Syrian conflict encompasses a wide variety of disputes, including
122. Israel: Apparent War Crimes in Gaza, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 13, 2018,
12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/13/israel-apparent-war-crimes-gaza.
See Marlise Simons & Alan Cowell, Palestinians Ask I.C.C. to Open Full Inquiry into
Israel, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/
world/middleeast/palestinians-israel-gaza.html.
123. Bahea Namoor, Palestinians Displaced by Force, AL JAZEERA: PALESTINE
REMIX, https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/palestineremix/ deportees.html#/21 (last
visited Dec.1, 2019).
124. Compare Israel and Palestine: Events of 2018, HUM. RTS. WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/israel/palestine (last visited
Dec. 1, 2019), with Rohingya Refugee Crisis, supra note 14.
125. ELIZABETH FERRIS & KEMAL KIRIŞCI, THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHAOS:
SYRIA’S HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AND THE FAILURE TO PROTECT 5 (2016).
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a civil war, which the Syrian government legitimizes as a fight against
terrorism. 126 The Syrian conflict is attributable to “deep-seated political
and economic factors endemic to the region and [to] specific actions
taken by the Bashar al-Assad regime and various insurgent groups.” 127
Since the conflict began in 2011, 128 the court has not been able to
address the situation, partly because the UN’s procedures affected the
court’s ability to tackle the conflict.
Throughout the conflict, evidence of the regime’s indiscriminate
approach to prosecuting the war has led to multiple attempts to build
a case for war crimes. Evidence includes the use of chemical
weapons, the detention and execution of many without trial, and the
use of torture. There had previously been an attempt to refer the
government to the ICC back in 2014, when more than 60 countries
backed a UN Security Council resolution. However, it was vetoed by
Russia and China, the former remaining a staunch ally of the Assad
regime. 129

Since the international community’s failed attempts to provide
justice for Syria, American and European courts have led the discussion
of such atrocious crimes, in which Syrian lawyers and human rights
activists succeeded. 130 Moreover, a recent filing by human rights
lawyers may lead to further successes in this movement to obtain
justice. The lawyers brought two lawsuits against Syria on behalf of

126. Daniel Corstange & Erin A. York, Sectarian Framing in the Syrian Civil
War, 62 AM. J. POL. SCI. 441, 454 (2018).
127. FERRIS & KIRIŞCI, supra note 125, at 109.
128. Id. at 7.
129. Edwin Wood, Syrian Refugees Seek Justice Against Assad Government in
ICC, THE ORG. FOR WORLD PEACE (Mar. 27, 2019), http://theowp.org/syrianrefugees-seek-justice-against-assad-government-in-icc/.
130. Maryam Saleh, Syrian Refugees Use Precedent Set in Rohingya Case to
Try to Bring Government Officials Before the International Criminal Court,
INTERCEPT (Mar. 16, 2019, 4:57 AM), https://theintercept.com/2019/03/16/syriaconflict-internation-criminal-court/ (“The biggest success so far has been in Germany,
where authorities last month arrested a former high-ranking Syrian intelligence officer
and two others who are accused of crimes against humanity for torturing detainees in
Syrian prisons. Other cases remain pending in France, Sweden, and Spain. (Cadman
and al-Bunni[, two lawyers,] have been involved with some of these cases.)”).
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Syrian refugees in Jordan. 131 Unsurprisingly, the lawyers rely on the
recent precedent regarding the Rohingya crisis to urge the ICC to
investigate alleged crimes committed by Syria. 132 In their Article 15
communications with the ICC, the two groups of lawyers alleged
Syria’s violation of international law. 133 However, Article 15
communications are not enough to open an investigation against a
government until “‘the prosecutor . . . compile[s] that information and
decide[s] whether to take it to a judge and move forward with a
preliminary investigation.’” 134
Perhaps the ICC could be a key arbiter for the Syrian people
because regional organizations do not possess the tools necessary to
adjudicate the dispute, and the UN may also prove ineffective.135
Therefore, with the ICC’s recent Rohingya decision, the court may have
jurisdiction to bring Bashar al-Assad’s regime and insurgent groups to
justice. Unlike the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Syrian conflict
shares more characteristics with the Rohingya crisis, primarily the
magnitude of people it has affected; this makes it a stronger case for the
court to assert its jurisdiction over.
As noted above, there are three preconditions for the court to assert
jurisdiction. First, one of the affected parties must be a Rome Statute
signatory. In the Syrian conflict, one of the affected countries is

131. Syria War: Lawyers Submit First War Crimes Cases Against Assad, BBC
NEWS (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47483714
[hereinafter Syria War].
132. Id.
133. Saleh, supra note 130. Article 15 communications are the means by which
“any individual, group, or organization can send information on alleged or potential
ICC crimes to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC.” How to File a
Communication to the ICC-Prosecutor, COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT.,
http://coalitionfortheicc.org/how-file-communication-icc-prosecutor (last visited
Dec. 1, 2019).
134. Saleh, supra note 130 (quoting Heidi Nichols Haddad, author of “The
Hidden Hands of Justice: NGOs, Human Rights, and International Courts”).
135. FERRIS & KIRIŞCI, supra note 125, at 112. See generally Shelby Black,
Universal Jurisdiction and Syria: A Treaty Based Expansion of Universal Jurisdiction
as a Solution to Impunity, 21 INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 177 (2018) (discussing the
U.N.’s political differences and deadlock as a likely impediment to addressing the
Syrian conflict).
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Jordan, 136 which is a State Party to the Rome Statute. 137 On the other
hand, the aggressor, Syria, has not accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction by
either ratifying the Rome Statute or accepting its limited jurisdiction.138
Second, the crime(s) committed must be crime(s) that the ICC has
jurisdiction over. Here, one of the crimes alleged is deportation, which
as discussed above is a crime under the ICC’s jurisdiction as expressly
stated in Article 7(1)(d) of the Rome Statute. 139 Since 2011, the Syrian
conflict has driven more than 5.6 million Syrians to flee their country
into the neighboring countries of “Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and
beyond.” 140 Jordan, in particular, has taken in over 655,000 Syrian
refugees. 141
Third, at least one element of the crime(s) must be committed
within a State Party’s territory. Applying the court’s trans-border
element analysis, Syrians crossing Syria’s southern border into Jordan
means that part of the crime of deportation occurred inside a State
Party’s territory: Jordan. Therefore, the ICC may be able to exert
jurisdiction over Syria’s war crime of deportation. The ICC may have
a stronger argument to investigate the Syrian conflict than it had for the
Rohingya crisis because of the greater magnitude of people affected by
the conflict. In the Rohingya crisis, the Myanmar government forced
over 700,000 Rohingya to flee, whereas Bashar al-Assad’s regime has
forced over five million Syrian’s to flee Syria. 142 Syrians have alleged
the Assad regime committed other crimes, such as “the use of chemical
weapons, indiscriminate bombings of civilian centers, and torture.” 143
However, these other crimes fall under the court’s Trojan Horse
argument, which is incompatible with international law and principles
of state sovereignty because these other crimes do not share a transborder element.
136. Syria War, supra note 131.
137. Jordan, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states
parties/asian states/Pages/jordan.aspx (last visited Dec. 1, 2019).
138. Black, supra note 135, at 184. See The States Parties to the Rome Statute,
supra note 39 (Syria is not listed as a State Party).
139. Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 7(1)(d).
HIGH
COMM’R
FOR
REFUGEES,
140. Syria
Emergency,
U.N.
https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html (last updated Apr. 19, 2019).
141. Id.
142. Saleh, supra note 130.
143. Id.
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Fourth, the crime must contain a trans-border element or have a
trans-border effect. The Syrian crisis has affected Jordan in several
ways. Most notably, Jordan’s acceptance of a sizeable number of
Syrian refugees “put dramatic strains on Jordan’s financial and limited
natural resources, including water.” 144 The large displacement of
Syrians into Jordan could place Jordan in economic jeopardy.
Specifically, “hosting refugees who make up more than 10 percent of
the population in a relatively small and resource-poor country . . . runs
the risk of transforming Jordan from a ‘middle income’ to a ‘low
income’ country.” 145
As of 2019, the Syrian conflict likely presents a stronger case for
the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction over than the Rohingya crisis. It is
puzzling that the court failed to address the Syrian conflict before the
Rohingya crisis given the stronger evidence and magnitude of the
crimes. If the ICC does not take any concrete action, “the prospect of
a post-Assad state—or a period of transitional justice—is difficult to
imagine.” 146
Given the length of investigations and lack of referrals, it may take
some time to appreciate the potential far-reaching effect of the court’s
precedent in its Rohingya decision on other humanitarian crises. Both
the Syrian and Israeli-Palestinian conflict can no longer go unaddressed
without formal judicial proceedings. Traditional reprimands like
sanctions and moral outrage have failed to effectively resolve the
conflicts. Therefore, the ICC’s new precedent should signal to the
international community that it must end political gridlock and
intervene to end humanitarian crises. However, if the international
community fails to provide comprehensive solutions to address human
rights, the ICC would still be the best forum for ensuring that human
rights do not go unaddressed.
V. THE COURT’S ALTERNATE CHOICES
The court’s decision regarding the Rohingya people is a necessary
precedent to tackle human rights violations. However, the court
reached its decision by broadly interpreting its jurisdictional reach
144. FERRIS & KIRIŞCI, supra note 125, at 50.
145. Id.
146. Saleh, supra note 130.
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under the Rome Statute, which may not have been the best approach
but was the most feasible option. The court had at least two other
choices to address its lack of express jurisdiction that would likely not
have been as controversial.
First, the court could have proposed an amendment to the Rome
Statute. Article 121 of the Rome Statue allows any State Party to
propose an amendment. 147 Adopting an amendment requires a twothirds majority vote. 148 By pursuing the amendment process, the court
could have avoided interpreting its own jurisdictional authority.
Instead, the court chose to justify its position by citing national and
international laws that support its argument. An amendment to Article
12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute could have expressly clarified that only
one element of a crime must occur inside a State Party’s territory for
the court to have jurisdiction over the claim. This amendment would
not have been problematic because the court gave ample evidence of
national authorities using express language in their own laws to justify
exercising similar trans-border jurisdiction.
As of 2019, the language of Article 12(2)(a) states that the court
can assert jurisdiction to investigate crimes over “[t]he State on the
territory of which the conduct in question occurred.” 149 A new
amendment to Article 12 could have stated the court has jurisdiction
over “[t]he State on the territory of which the entirety or part of the
conduct in question occurred.” However, the court would have needed
to obtain the two-thirds majority vote required to adopt an amendment.
Although it is an obstacle, obtaining a two-thirds majority vote is more
plausible within the ICC than within another body like the U.N., where
approximately eighty percent of resolutions are adopted through
consensus. 150
However, if adopting an amendment was improbable, the court had
a second option to strengthen its argument for trans-border jurisdiction.
Instead of acting independently, the court could have asked the State
Parties for a referral regarding the Rohingya crisis. If Bangladesh, the
147. Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 121(1).
148. Id. art. 121(3).
149. Id. art. 12(2)(a).
150. How Decisions Are Made at the UN, UNITED NATIONS,
https://outreach.un.org/mun/content/how-decisions-are-made-un (last visited Dec. 1,
2019) (consensus means “all of the Member States agree to adopt a resolution without
taking a vote”).
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affected State Party, had made a referral, the court would have had a
stronger argument for asserting jurisdiction. One of the greatest
drawbacks of the Rohingya crisis not being referred to the court is that
the ICC could only address a fraction of the crimes alleged against
Myanmar because of its ruling’s limited scope, 151 specifically its focus
on the need for a trans-border element. A referral would have allowed
the ICC to open a formal investigation. Without a formal investigation,
the court had to resort to opening a preliminary investigation, which
may take years to conclude, “increas[ing] the chances that critical
evidence will deteriorate or be lost entirely, reducing the possibility of
effective prosecution.” 152 Pursuing these alternatives for future
investigations could give the court the individual support of State
Parties and the credibility needed to fully prosecute crimes.
These procedural alternatives are limited short-term solutions to
bolster the ICC’s assertion of jurisdiction; however, to effectively
address human rights violations, the international community must
recognize that international judicial bodies, like the ICC, need broader
jurisdictional authority.
CONCLUSION
Although there have been talks between Myanmar and Bangladesh,
there is “no current guarantee of public safety.” 153 As a result, “only
11 percent of recently surveyed Rohingya refugees expressed a desire
to return” to Myanmar. 154 Myanmar claims that it would welcome back
the refugees, but the reality is that the Rohingya people face a greater
danger than the crime of deportation currently being investigated by the
ICC—the Myanmar government’s annihilation of the Rohingya

151. Myanmar: Why an IIIM and Security Council Referral Are Needed Despite
the ICC Ruling Relating to Bangladesh, INT’L COMMISSION OF JURISTS (Sept. 13,
2018), https://www.icj.org/myanmar-why-an-iiim-and-security-council-referral-areneeded-despite-the-icc-ruling-relating-to-bangladesh/.
152. Id.
153. Shane McCarthy, Rohingya crisis: Why Policy Solutions Are Tricky and
What to Do About It, GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. (Jan. 7, 2019),
http://gppreview.com/2019/01/07/rohingya-crisis-policy-solutions-tricky/.
154. Id.
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population through ethnic cleansing and genocide. 155 As a court of last
resort, 156 the ICC is currently the Rohingya’s only hope for justice.
However, to make real progress in resolving humanitarian crises,
the international community must take formal action. In this regard, on
September 16, 2018, the United States House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing to discuss the Genocide
Against the Burmese Rohingya. 157 In the hearing, some speakers
showed support for the ICC’s efforts while others were more
skeptical. 158 For example, some speakers stated that “the ICC is not
going to answer [the Rohingya crisis] but it’s going to put more world
pressure [on Myanmar]. It’s sort of collective. It’s why we need . . .
Congress[,] . . . the U.N.[,] . . . [and] the ICC.” 159 However, some
believe that even these efforts may be unsuccessful because the
President has “trashed the ICC,” 160 thus destroying the possibility of
international collaborative efforts. To best address these humanitarian
crises, any derogatory views regarding the ICC must be put aside.
World leaders must recognize that the problem is not the ICC but the
ineffective assistance of the international community, which has made
the ICC the last resort for individuals whose human rights have been
violated.
Carlos E. Gomez*

155. Curfman, supra note 46.
RTS.
WATCH,
156. International
Criminal
Court,
HUM.
https://www.hrw.org/topic/justicia-internacional/international-criminal-court
(last
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157. Hearing, supra note 16.
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